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The Changing Definition of Security 
  A reconfiguration of Europe's strategic landscape and a redefinition of security have taken place in 
Europe.   The security concerns of individual states and the NATO alliance have expanded and now 
embrace not only the preoccupation with territorial integrity and military security, but also include 
issues ranging from macroeconomic stability to environmental degradation.  This broadened 
redefinition of security raises an important question:  what connections are there between the military 
and these broader nonmilitary elements of security?  For the greater part of the cold war era, security 
was conceived primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of military security, in terms of sustaining the 
nuclear balance of terror between the superpowers and the conventional balance of power on the 
Eurasian landmass.  Despite the heavy emphasis upon the military element of national security, 
attention was paid to the economic underpinnings of military prowess.  Nonetheless, economic issues 
were subordinated and treated as an adjunct to the more important and pressing issue of military 
security.  Economic security was not a relevant analytical category until the late 1960s.  
  Economic issues grew more salient in the late 1960s and were increasingly treated as important 
political and broader architectural elements of both national security and the larger security order.  A 
few studies of the western alliance in the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasized the importance of 
economic relations between the members of the Atlantic alliance; they focused on the importance of 
those economic relationships as critical struts undergirding the Atlantic Alliance and the security of its 
member-states.1  The growing remoteness of a military threat to European security combined with an 
increased frequency of economic conflict within the Atlantic area during the 1970s and 1980s.  This 
period saw the erosion of American hegemony and the rise of Germany and Japan, the slow collapse of 
the Bretton Woods monetary system between 1971 and 1973, the two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, and 
the consequent concerns over the access to critical raw materials, the divergence of macroeconomic 
policies throughout the 1980s, and a proclivity for bilateralism in trade relations.  Economic issues 
moved to the `top table' of diplomatic discourse within the Atlantic area.2  By the end of the 1980s, the 
security concerns of the Europeans, particularly the Germans, were increasingly expressed in an 
economic rather than military idiom.3  
  The collapse of the post-Yalta security order has initiated the process of recalibrating national 
interests to conform with the pressures and opportunities presented by the emerging European security 
order, and the necessity of striking a balance between the economic, political and military requirements 
of security.  It has also fixed the attention of policy-makers and analysts upon the institutions and 
configuration of institutions that will define the post-Yalta security order in Europe.   
  The end of the cold war security order and its sudden transformation in 1989 has altered the 
structure of the European state system, intensified the interrelationship between military security and 
economic security and possibly inverted their relative importance, and raised new possibilities for 
cooperation in military and economic affairs.  These changes also raise questions about the 
institutional choices available to reconfigure the European security space and the consequences of the 
choices already made. In this chapter, we examine the causes and consequences of the reconfiguration 
of the institutions of European security that constitute, in turn, the building blocks of the new European 
security architecture.  
 
I.  The Changed International Context 
  From the perspective of national policy-makers in North America or Europe, the world has 
experienced fundamental changes.  The Warsaw Pact has dissolved and the Soviet Union has dissolved 
into a large number of independent republics tenuously connected by preexisting economic ties and a 
paper confederation.  The nations of north central and eastern Europe are not only undergoing a 
political and economic transformation simultaneously, but many of these states seek membership in the western clubs, particularly NATO and the European Union.  The ideological enmity that marked 
relations among the two post-war blocs has given way to growing ideological conformity.  Germany is 
united and has gained a new centrality, both geographically and politically, at the center of the `new' 
Europe.  And NATO has been robbed of its postwar raison d'etre.   
  Yet from the perspective of the `neorealism', it is not clear that anything has fundamentally 
changed.  For the neorealists, the `deep structure' of the international system remains `anarchic' and 
competitive.  States are still driven by a concern over relative gains and by the pursuit of power.  The 
political change that was set in motion in 1989 did little to change the actual distribution of capabilities 
within the system; the system is still characterized by military bipolarity.4  Likewise, from the 
perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, not much has changed either.  The system remains 
essentially anarchical, but anarchy is modified generally and by issue-area sets of rules and institutions 
accepted by states in their own common interest.  States are driven by the imperative of absolute gain 
and economic competition which requires cooperation.   The importance of economic relationships 
(and the possibility of cooperation) has only been heightened by the collapse of the postwar enmity 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances and the search for a new set of military relationships 
that foster economic cooperation.  The end of the cold war, in redirecting attention to the underlying 
importance of economic capabilities, has changed the perception of power and consequently its 
distribution.  The system is clearly multipolar and the currency of power is economic in nature.5   
  The contemporary international system supplies ample empirical evidence to support either set of 
contentions.  It is our view, however, that the changes that have taken place in Europe suggest that the 
emergent European security order casts a doubt on the usefulness of either theory if it requires the 
exclusion of the other.   
  The state remains the primary actor in the contemporary international system.  Yet the state is 
changing in a number of important ways.  First, the nation-states of Europe and North America are 
experiencing greater levels of openness, in the real as well as the financial sectors of the economy.  
Second, the tension between autonomy and interdependence in the conduct of economic affairs is 
slowly being resolved in favor of the latter; it is increasingly true that "internal state power is sustained 
by external cooperation."6  Third, external cooperation has taken the form of ceding some sovereign 
power to non-state actors, ranging from supranational actors (most notably the European Union in the 
case of the western European states) to international organizations (for instance, the International 
Monetary Fund and International Atomic Energy Agency).  States are increasingly constrained in the 
formation or execution of policy; in fact, state preferences are increasingly shaped by international 
institutions and are subject to the principles, norms, and rules of them.7  And finally, the European 
state system, only recently comprised of ideologically heterogeneous states, is undergoing a 
transformation.  The process of democratization and the embrace of the market-economy in eastern 
and north central Europe is producing a more homogeneous state system.  One consequence of this 
development is the creation of a common frame of reference amongst the nations of the European 
security space that should facilitate cooperation, just as the preexisting ideological opposition provided 
a barrier to cooperation between the two halves of Europe.8  
  A second category of change is the currency of power in the security space occupied by the states 
of North America and Europe.  The primacy of military security, the negligible probability of nuclear 
war, and the concern with national survival remain the paramount concerns of the major European 
powers.  Yet, as has been pointed out by many others, a shift has been slowly taking place in the 
relative importance of military security and economic welfare.  As economic issues increased in 
salience in the 1970s and 1980s, military issues and the concern with military security suffered a 
corresponding decline.  This preexisting shift of emphasis was transformed by the end of the cold war.   
The currency of military power has been devalued, particularly in the relations amongst the wealthy 
states of the European security space, and is being driven out by the currencies of commercial 
competitiveness and economic capacity.  The dominance of the technological frontier, essential for 
sustaining commercial competitiveness on world markets, has become the arena of intense interstate 
competition between the North American and western European states.  Moreover, only the economic 
capacity of the NATO member-states can finance the long-term transition to the market economy and 
democracy in the former member-states of the Warsaw Pact.   
  The new currency of power has thus had the effect of altering the distribution of capabilities in the 
European security space.  Whereas cold war Europe was characterized by political-military bipolarity 
dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, post-Cold War Europe is characterized by an economic multipolarity cojoined by a military bipolarity that, for the time being, is peripheral to the 
economic and environmental security concerns of the states occupying the European security space.   
The end of the cold war did not cause or even precipitate the redistribution of capabilities; rather, it 
reflects the process of America's hegemonic rise and decline that has become particularly meaningful 
and resonant in the changed international context.9  This change in the relevant currency of power in 
the `new' Europe raises questions about the polarity of the system.   
  There are at least two sectors of the international system that bear directly upon the future 
contours of the European security area:  the economic sector and the political-military sector.10   The 
character of the post-cold war international system is partially dependent upon the relationship 
between the economic and political-military components of power.  This relationship can be treated as 
strictly aggregative (the combination of those resources defines a state's power), as strictly 
disaggregative (the two components of power resist combination), and as interdependent (there is some 
fungibility between the two components).  If the elements of power are strictly aggregative, then the 
system will be characterized by a unipolarity.   But a unipolar system, with the United States 
functioning as the system pivot, would most likely be unipolar without hegemony or even effective 
leadership.  It is unlikely that the United States can be an effective leader:  it lacks the incentives and 
more importantly the resources to assume the costs of leadership or the ability to sanction or provide 
incentives for others to follow.11  If the elements of power are strictly disaggregative, the European 
state system will be characterized by a military-political bipolarity softened by the process of economic 
and political homogenization within Europe and by an economic multipolarity sharpened by 
technological competition.  And if the elements of power are interdependent, the European security 
space could well be characterized by a coalition or concert of the great powers or even by a rule-based 
system.  Although the choice may be made by assumption, the changed context of the international 
system strongly suggests that the elements of power be treated as interdependent.  
  The core issue of the neorealist-neoinstitutionalist debate is located in the opposed assumptions 
about state preferences.  The neorealist school assumes that states are relative gains maximizers, and 
the neoliberal institutionalist school assumes that states are absolute gains maximizers.   The former 
school is pessimistic about the likelihood and sustainability of cooperation, whereas the latter school 
are conditionally optimistic about the likelihood and sustainability of cooperation.  Robert Powell has 
argued quite convincingly, however, that preferences are not immutable, but are linked quite closely to 
the constraints facing a state;12  and that the feasibility of cooperation is linked to the level of amity 
and enmity in the international system.13  Where there are high levels of enmity, cooperation is 
unlikely:  an unequal absolute gain derived from cooperation today could lead to military defeat 
tomorrow.  Where there are high levels of amity, on the other hand, cooperation is more likely:  a 
state's relative loss today will not be employed against it tomorrow.  The implications of Powell's 
argument are of significance for the institutional architecture and pattern of cooperation in the post-
cold war European security space. 
  It is relatively safe to assume that the resort to interstate war is no longer at issue in the `new 
Europe,' notwithstanding the civil conflicts raging in the former Yugoslavia and simmering in the 
former Soviet Union.  The enmity of the pre-1989 European security area, generated by two mutually 
opposed and ideologically antagonistic military alliances, is no more.  In its place we find a Europe 
where ideological fragmentation is being replaced by an ideological conformity; where opposed 
military alliances have been replaced by a single military alliance, NATO, in search of a pan-European 
security role;  and where the wealthy states of Europe are seeking to effect the economic and political 
transformation of central and eastern Europe.  Amity, then, has become the hall-mark of interstate 
relations in the `new Europe.'  This change of context should lead us to expect, then, greater 
cooperation between the states of the western and eastern portions of the continent.  And that 
cooperation is in fact taking place.  The fear of relative gains has been replaced with a concern for 
ensuring cooperative outcomes that deliver large absolute gains.  A focus on context should lead to the 
expectation of cooperation between the former member states of the two cold war alliances; and 
cooperation in economic, military, and political affairs is in fact occurring.  However, it is also the case 
that amity between the two halves of Europe has created the paradox of growing enmity amongst and 
decreased cooperation between the member-states of NATO.14   
  The cost of noncooperation during the cold-war carried with it potentially high costs for individual 
and collective security.  The necessity of cooperation in the military realm created an incentive to 
minimize conflict and noncooperation in the economic realm.  The potential use of force against NATO member-states by the Warsaw Pact created a context that encouraged cooperation in economic 
affairs to ensure large absolute gains to meet the welfare and military security demands of those states.  
With the end of the cold war, however, the costs of defection have declined precipitously:  the absence 
of cooperation between Europe and North America in economic affairs, for example, no longer carries 
with it a high cost in security terms.  And, perhaps more importantly, the benefits of defection have 
risen markedly:  if, as we have argued above, the most important currency of power is economic and 
the source of that power is dominance of the technological frontier, then we should expect less 
cooperation in economic affairs amongst the NATO allies today than occurred during the cold war.15   
II.  The Transformation of the Post-War Security Dilemmas 
  The new-found amity in the European security space has also had the effect of transforming the 
two security dilemmas facing states.  Robert Jervis locates the security dilemma in the unhappy 
circumstance that "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the 
security of others."16  The increment of one state's security will have the unintended or unwanted 
effect of decreasing the security of another state.  The security dilemma is exacerbated by the fear of 
exploitation; the more secure is a state, the more relaxed it can be in making a decision to cooperate 
and run the risk of defection by another.  The security dilemma is also driven by the subjective security 
requirements of decision-makers.  National decision-makers have different perceptions of the security 
threat and have correspondingly different levels of desired security:  the lower the perceived security 
threat, the less will the security dilemma drive state policy.  Moreover, as Jervis notes, the security 
dilemma "will not operate as strongly when pressing domestic concerns increase the opportunity costs 
of armaments."17  The intensity of the security dilemma is dependent upon a final characteristic of the 
security environment:  the offensive-defensive balance.  Jervis argues that where the defense has the 
advantage in war and where an offensive posture is distinguishable from a defensive posture, that 
strategic environment will be "doubly stable."  First, since the advantage is possessed by the defender, 
the incentive to attack will be reduced.  And second, the aggressor signals its intention to attack when 
it acquires offensive forces.  The opposite combination (offense has the advantage and the two postures 
are indistinguishable) is "doubly dangerous:"  the advantage is possessed by offensive forces, the 
inability to distinguish between offensive and defensive weaponry generates unstable arms races, and 
states possess a powerful incentive to strike first in a crisis situation.18 
  A second security dilemma facing decision-makers is the allocation of "limited resources  between 
domestic, internal ends, and a military sector...each state must decide how to divide its resources 
between guns and butter."19  The division of resources between guns and butter, and the actual level of 
consumption of both goods is determined by two factors:  the productive capacity of a society and its 
preferences.  The productive capacity of a society may be represented by a transformation curve 
plotting the different combinations of guns and butter that a society can produce given its endowment 
of land, labor, capital and technology.  The transformation curve, ab, is represented in figure one.  The 
preferences of a society may be sketched by a series of indifference curves that represent different 
"bundles" of guns and butter that are equalling satisfying at any point along any given indifference 
curve, where a bundle of goods along indifference curve Ub (e.g., point e) is preferable to a bundle of 
goods along indifference curve Ua (e.g., points c or d).  The most efficient point of consumption is 
found at the point of tangency between the indifference curve and the transformation curve, point e  At 
point e, our hypothetical state will consume Ox of guns and Oy of butter.  
  The slope of indifference curves and the shape of transformation curves varies from state to state.  
Variations in the transformation curves reflects different combinations of the factors of production and 
different levels of productivity in the sectors producing guns and butter.  Variations in the slope of the 
indifference curves between societies reflects, for example, changes in the elite preferences and the 
geopolitical context of a state; internal and external changes that include changes in domestic political 
coalitions or in the technology of war; and an increase (or diminution) of a state's wealth will have the 
effect of shifting preferences in the consumption of guns and butter.20  More generally, the `spectre of 
war' determines the allocation of national resources between guns and butter; it determines the bias of 
the indifference curve towards the consumption of guns as opposed to butter.  The larger the shadow 
cast by war, the more immediate is the military security threat to a state, the greater will the level of 
national resources devoted to guns.  Conversely, the more the shadow of war recedes into the 
background, the more distant is the military security threat to a state, the greater will be the level of 
national resources devoted to butter.21   These two security dilemmas have become less intense and transformed by the transition to post-
cold war Europe.  The nations of the West fear the negative consequences of insecurity in the East.  
Consequently, any measures taken by the nations of the East that enhance national security, defined 
broadly in its military or economic dimensions, is seen as a positive contribution to European security.  
It also provides the incentive and possibility for the nations of western Europe to cooperate with its 
eastern neighbors even at the risk of being exploited; free-riding by the east poses a lesser threat to the 
West than does a shattering of a fragile peace.   
  The perception of a security threat has dwindled as well.  The confrontation of the two postwar 
alliances has ended.  The Warsaw Pact has disintegraed and NATO remains intact.  The threat once 
posed to the West has become not only hypothetical but improbable as well.  The military threat to the 
West is limited to a residual concern over Russian intentions in its former internal empire, and that 
residual concern is strongest in the United States and weakest amongst the states of western Europe. 
  The security dilemma has also been inverted by the domestic economic and political difficulties 
experienced in Europe and North America.  In western Europe and North America, attention has been 
directed to the need to overcome structural unemployment and to (re)discover the grail of 
noninflationary growth with full employment.  Publics and elites in the west have demanded that the 
`peace dividend' be employed to redress pressing social, budgetary, economic, and even environmental 
problems caused by or ignored during the cold war.  In the east, publics and elites are preoccupied with 
the task of recasting national economies, national polities, and habits of mind.  The problems 
associated with the transition to market economies and democracy have pushed the problem of military 
security into a residual category, whose immediacy rises and falls in response to temporary threats, real 
and imagined, emanating primarily from Russia.   
  The security dilemma has also been transformed by the change that has taken place in the 
offensive-defensive balance:  Russian military forces have largely retreated to their national boundaries, 
nations in the east and west have adopted some variation of the concept of `defensive-defense,' 
NATO's `new strategic concept' emphasizes the importance of out-of-area tasks for NATO and has 
undergone a major restructuring of forces to meet that need.  Moreover, the reduction of conventional 
force levels embodied in the CFE agreements makes an offensive attack unlikely, the warning time of 
a major land assault has been increased to a year on the European continent, and continuing declines in 
defense budgets seem likely into the medium-term. The security dilemma identified by Jervis has at a 
minimum become less intense with the end of the cold war.  In our view, it would be closer to the mark 
to argue that it no longer operative in the European security space.  Rather, it makes more sense to 
argue that many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security increases the security of 
others in post-cold war Europe.  
  The distribution of the national product between guns and butter has also been changed by the end 
of the cold war.  Preferences, capabilities, and the procurement of security have all been changed; and 
that change has been fundamental in the east.   There has been a shift in preferences in post-cold war 
Europe:  for all the countries located in the European security space there has been rightward shift of 
national utility curves; there is now a preference for more butter and fewer guns.  For the states of 
central and eastern Europe, this shift in preferences reflects the combined effect of new political elites 
organising the transition to democracy and the market economy, a less threatening geopolitical context 
(namely, the end of the Soviet imperium and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself), and greater 
cooperation between the west and east enabling (and requiring) that shift to take place.   
  The nations of the former Warsaw Pact have also experienced precipitous declines in their gross 
national products, reflecting the eradication of inefficiencies in labor and capital markets and the run-
down of the defense sector of those economies.  This decline in gross national product means that 
nations of central and eastern Europe have experienced not only a shift in the composition of the 
bundle of goods they prefer, but a contraction of the amount of guns and butter available for 
consumption.  Thus, a change in the shape of the transformation curve in combination with a rightward 
shift of utility curves have combined to increase the demand for butter, to decrease the demand for 
guns, and to reduce the total amount of guns and butter that are available for consumption.  In the west, 
the shift in preferences reflects the political demand and expectation among the governed as well as 
amongst those who govern that there would be a `peace dividend' expended on social and economic ills, 
that defense related industries would be converted to civilian commercial production, and that the 
geopolitical context facing most western European states would become more reassuring.  Thus, the rightward shift of North American and European indifference curves has been driven by a variety of 
factors that may be summarized by the simple observation that the cold war has ended.   
  The increased demand for non-defense goods in the east suggests that a new dilemma over the 
division of the national product now faces the West.  Whereas security during the cold war was defined 
primarily in terms of military security and the shadow of war loomed over the European continent, in 
post-cold war Europe security is defined increasingly in economic terms and the shadow of war has 
been displaced by the threat of political and economic chaos in central and eastern Europe.  The 
military instrument is an inappropriate policy instrument to meet this new threat, although it could be 
used to alleviate its symptoms---spreading civil war and mass migration.  The most effective 
instruments in diplomatic toolboxes of the western democracies are economic and financial:  the 
extension of free trade agreements, financial aid to support the transition to the market economy, the 
provision of technical assistance to ease that transition, financial support to redress environmental 
degradation, and financial assistance to lift the burden of debt.  The `peace dividend' can not solely 
devoted to national welfare objectives; rather some of it must be diverted to supporting the indirect 
systemic task to minimizing the threat of political and societal chaos in the east.  But unlike the 
conventional defense expenditures, which arguably provide direct benefits to the national economy, 
these systemic expenditures provide diffuse benefits at best and their contribution to systemic stability 
remains questionable.  Although the political return on this type of expenditure is uncertain and defies 
exact measurement, it is nonetheless essential to systemic stability.  The competition between guns and 
butter has been decided in favor of butter; but a new competition for resources has taken its place. 
  This new competition for resources, for expenditures on the national economy with direct welfare 
benefits and on the system with diffuse and uncertain benefits, reveals a paradox of the post-cold war 
world.  At a time when economic and financial capacity are most important for determining the 
stability and contours of the future European security order, when there is an opportunity to be `present 
at the creation' of a new international order, the major players in the international system are unable (or 
unwilling) to deliver the goods.  The United States, Germany, and Japan have been disabled by recent 
economic difficulties.  The United States has been rendered ineffective owing to the debtor status it 
acquired over the course of the 1980s.  The American national debt grew from around $1 trillion in 
1980 to over $4 trillion by 1994; interest payments alone will consume $203.4 billion in 1994, which 
equals 13.7% of the national budget.  These budgetary difficulties are mirrored in the trade account:  
the United States has run a cumulative trade deficit of over $400 billion of dollars since 1990.22  The 
Federal Republic, although it has contributed the lion's share of G-24 aid to the east, has been disabled 
by the costs of unification.  The budgetary costs of unification have far exceeded the initial estimates.  
In 1989 the Federal Government projected a total cost of DM 110 billion to finance the restructuring of 
eastern Germany, yet the level of government transfers from western to eastern Germany has exceeded 
that amount on an annual basis.  Public sector debt, as a percentage of GNP, deteriorated from a 0.2% 
surplus in 1989 to 7.5% deficit in 1993.  Moreover, policy errors (the exchange for western DMs for 
eastern DMs on a 1:1 basis, the rapid wage increases in the east, and a perhaps too restrictive monetary 
policy by the Bundesbank), a high level of pent-up demand, and rising income in eastern Germany 
have reduced German exports and increased German imports, thus reducing the size of Germany's 
trade balance---the source of its financial clout over the course of the post-war period.23  The Japanese 
unwillingness to contribute substantial sums to the recasting of central and eastern Europe reflects not 
only the outstanding territorial dispute with Russia, but an understandable psychological distance from 
Europe.  That unwillingness has been joined by a relative inability to contribute:  the bursting of the 
stock and property market bubbles, and the thin ruling majority of the Murayama government, reduce 
further the likelihood of a significant Japanese contribution to the recasting of central Europe.24  
III.  The Changing Relationship between Military and Economic Security 
  Mercantilist thought has been more conscious of the connection between economic prosperity and 
military security than contemporary neoclassical economic thought.  The critical roles played by 
economic capacity and wealth as essential components of state security and state power are central 
concerns of mercantilist thought, even though the precise relationship between `power' and `plenty' 
varies considerably.25  Many contemporary analysts do not embrace the broad mercantilist view that 
economic capacity is not only an essential instrumental objective of national policy, but a proper end 
of state policy.  Rather, the importance and relationship between power and plenty is reduced to a 
narrower instrumental approach.     At the most general level, the instrumental treatment of of economic security is focuses on the 
connection between economic growth and national security, particularly on determining how or 
whether the rate of economic growth constrains the ability to achieve a desired level of military 
security.  The focus is on the trade-off between national security and economic welfare; and the 
necessity of growth to meet the dynamic requirements of each.  A second category of analysis 
examines the link between the level of economic growth and defense spending.  Here the concern is 
reduced to problem of determining the consequences of defence spending on national economic 
growth.  Defence spending, depending upon the analyst, is viewed as either a drag on or the motor 
driving domestic economic growth.26   A third approach focuses on the division of the national budget 
between defence and non-defence expenditures. Here the dominant concern is a distributional one 
within the constricting confines of the national budgetary process.  In this case, the relationship 
between the economy and military security is reduced to one of allocating scarce budgetary resources 
between two competing domains.27   
  Another approach is concerned with the connection between the erosion of national security and 
the openness of the national economy.  Here the level of trade, financial integration, and monetary 
interdependence becomes the Achilles's heal of a state's security policy.   Other analysts contract this 
concern to a focus upon the necessity of technological dominance to guarantee military security.28  
These analysts are concerned with the necessity of maintaining a state's position on the technological 
frontier, of translating technological dominance into a competitive edge in the production and 
deployment of military forces, and of guaranteeing the viability of the national industrial base.  The  
economic dimension of security is reduced to assuring a national capacity to create and supply the 
necessary technologies that are essential to sustained economic growth and a well-stocked military 
establishment.  A final category of analysis focuses on the connection between government 
macroeconomic policy and national security policy.  Here the inability of the state to correct payments 
or budgetary deficits or failure to correct a chronic external imbalance is treated as a potential threat to 
national security.  These concerns are perhaps best captured by the concept of `strategic overextension' 
that describes the seemingly inevitable incompatibility between commitments and capabilities of great 
powers, particularly the United States during the Reagan and Bush administrations.29   
   Generally speaking, the instrumental view of the relationship between economics and security is 
overly narrow and parochial.  It is narrow because it neither considers nor investigates the concept or 
content of economic security; it is parochial because it is fixated with the security from a national 
rather than a systemic perspective.  A broader concept of economic security deserves attention and 
elaboration, although such a conceptualisation faces a number of difficulties.  First, there is the 
question of what is to be protected.  As Barry Buzan argues, "the state's responsibilities are no where 
near so clearly defined in the economic sector as they are in the political and military ones."30  
Moreover, the market economy, and the accompanying market ideology sustaining it, are premised 
upon the insecurity of economic actors, particularly at the firm and individual level.  The problem, then, 
becomes the disentangling of desirable adjustments at the level of the individual and firm from 
undesirable developments at the level of the state (or system).    
  In his treatment of economic security, Buzan concludes that economic security can only have 
meaning in restricted circumstances and where there is a demonstrable linkage between the economy, 
on the one hand, and military capability, power or social identity on the other.  Yet issues impinging 
upon the content of economic capacity and national identity, ranging from monetary relations to 
macroeconomic policy to debt repudiation, are treated as essential and critical elements of the 
inexorable ebb and flow of the market mechanism.31  While it is an attractive proposition that anarchy 
"is the optimal political environment for the market,"32 Buzan errors by conflating the absence of 
centralized power, law, and effective sanction at the level of the international system with the 
construction of a legal system, enforced by a political authority, necessary for the market mechanism 
to flourish at the level of the state.  In other words, advanced capitalism and the allocation of goods by 
the market are not politically neutral constructs.  Rather, they are social conventions that require both 
political support and protection; requirements that are provided by the state for internal transactions 
and by international institutions and conventions for external transactions.  
  There are then any number of definitions of economic security.  Our view of economic security 
focuses on the ability of the state "to maintain and develop the preferred socio-economic system and its 
welfare goals."33  The threat to this element of economic security flows from the eroded policy 
autonomy of advanced capitalist states, which reflects the heightened interdependence between the nations of the European security space in the real, financial, and monetary sectors of the economy.  
This erosion of autonomy is exacerbated by external uncertainty, by the instability of the international 
system.  The economic element of the national security threat differs in a number of respects from the 
military element of national security:   military threats to national security are both specific and 
intentional; economic  threats are both diffuse and systemic, they may be unintended or a secondary 
consequence of state action.34  But these troubling characteristics do not relieve us of the need to 
consider economic security as a distinct concept.  The consequences of macroeconomic malfeasance 
by a major economic power, the collapse of financial markets, major debt repudiation, a generalized 
hyperinflation, or a collapse of currency markets could have the effect of threatening the very survival 
of the state or renting the economic clauses of the social contract or upending the economic foundation 
of political stability.   
  This conception of economic security is embedded in the concept of a `civilian power' which has 
gained currency in the analysis of the security interests of Germany and Japan.35   Civilian powers, 
according to Hanns Maull, reflect the evolution state interests in response to a systemic development, 
namely, complex interdependence.  Complex interdependence requires a institutional framework 
guaranteeing systemic political and economic stability, a set of economic regimes enabling member-
states to reap the benefits of economic openness, and effective mechanisms for managing the 
dislocations caused by economic change.  Yet it also requires that states accept the norm of 
cooperation, an emphasis on the economic instruments of statecraft, the treatment of the military 
instrument as an instrument of last resort, and a preference for international institutions to effect 
international governance.36  An emphasis on the economic element of international relations, 
particularly upon the necessity of creating and sustaining a cooperative form of governance of 
otherwise competitive states linked by economic openness has the effect of pushing the concept of 
military security into the background and bringing the concept and content of economic security into 
the foreground. 
 
  Economic security has three identifiable and separable elements.  First, economic security reflects 
a concern over sustaining economic welfare, over the ability of the state to protect the social and 
economic fabric of a society.  Second, economic security involves the ability of a state to maintain 
societal integrity, of protecting society from migratory inflows or outflows that have the potential to 
reconfigure society.  And third, economic security concerns the ability of the state to foster a stable 
international economic environment in order to extract the welfare gains of openness while minimizing 
the potentially negative consequences for national welfare flowing from a loss of policy autonomy.  
The concept of economic security suffers from a number of disabilities:  it lacks the historical primacy 
and intellectual currency assigned to military security; it suffers from a diffuseness of both potential 
threats and remedies; and its content resists neat categories of threat.  Nonetheless, the resolution of the 
problem of security in the post-cold war European security space can not be effected by treating the 
economy as an instrumental adjunct to the military requirements of security or displacing the military 
definition of security with an economic conceptualization of security or by simply acknowledging that 
security has at least two elements, the military and the economic.  It requires a broader, systemic 
definition of the relationship between the economic and military dimensions of security; it requires that 
the economic dimension of security be treated as an integral part of the overall system of security 
rather than as an adjunct to the military dimension of security at the national level.   The concern 
embedded in this conceptualization of economic security is that the international economic system be 
constructed in such a manner that it creates a stable and secure environment supporting not only the 
economic sector of interstate relations but the political and military sectors as well. 
  The transformation of the European security space, particularly the rising disutility of military 
power for redressing the sources of instability in eastern and central Europe, strongly suggests that 
security be decomposed into two separate but interdependent elements:  the economic and the political-
military. It also suggests that an analysis of the institutions and architectures of the post-cold War 
European security space be framed not only by the concern with these two components of security, but 
with how these two elements of security intersect and the consequences of that intersection for the 
formulation of a stable European security architecture.  
IV.  The Problem of Cooperation 
  The military and economic elements of security share the common characteristic of providing a 
public good for the member-states of the European security space.  Yet the problem of defining the content of that public good and of ensuring the optimum supply of that public good---of reducing the 
incentive to free-ride---requires the creation of multilateral institutions facilitating the supply of 
economic and military security.37  Yet the barriers facing cooperation in the military and economic 
sectors have been held to pose quite different barriers to cooperation.   
  Economic and security affairs are characterized, according to Charles Lipson, by two 
fundamentally different forms of strategic interaction that account, in turn, for "significantly different 
institutional arrangements" in these two sectors of international politics.38  He notes that although both 
economic and security affairs experience bouts of cooperation and conflict, economic interactions, 
unlike security interactions, are often mediated by sets of norms, rules, and decision-making 
institutions constraining state choice and establishing convergent expectations.   Lipson allows that 
"both economic and military issues are often characterized by the opportunity for joint gains and by 
interdependent but autonomous decision making" and cannot therefore adequately explain institutional 
governance of economic issues and the relative absence of institutional governance of military issues.   
  Two important environmental conditions that distinguished these two sectors of interaction during 
the post-war era:  the high costs of betrayal in military affairs; and the (subsequent) treatment of 
military affairs as strictly competitive.  These two environmental conditions, in turn, suggested three 
categories of difference between military and economic issues.  First, economic interactions were 
normally defined as variable sum games, whereas security interactions were normally defined as 
constant sum games.  Cooperation in the economic realm was expected to improve national welfare, 
whereas cooperation in the security realm was restricted to intralliance relations.  Second, the penalty 
imposed on a state for unreciprocated cooperation in the economic realm was not considered to be 
perilous to the state's survival; the adoption of a tit-for-tat strategy did not carry a heavy sanction or run 
the risk of national ruination.  The penalty imposed on a state for unreciprocated cooperation in the 
security realm, however, was considered perilous for a state's survival; a tit-for-tat strategy as 
potentially disastrous.  And third, it was generally assumed that states focus upon absolute gains in 
choosing whether or not to cooperate in economic affairs; whereas in the intensely competitive security 
sector states were assumed to focus upon relative gains in choosing whether or not to cooperate.   It 
was moreover assumed that only with great difficulty could variable-sum economic games be 
translated into (noncooperative) constant-sum games; and that it was highly unlikely that the constant-
sum security game could be transformed into a (cooperative) variable-sum games.39   It is doubtful 
that these differences in military and economic interaction have survived the end of the cold war.  
  In the post-cold war European security space, there have been changes in the choices states face:  
military security and military issues have been transformed into a variable-sum game.  Cooperation 
between states on military issues holds out the prospect for a reciprocal enhancement of national 
security.  There has also been a change in the currency of power.  The down-grading of the military 
element of power, the downsizing of military establishments across Europe, and the transition to 
strategies of defensive-defence have diminished the severity of the penalty associated with 
unreciprocated cooperation.  Thus the prospect for confidence building measures and an 
institutinalised system of cooperation in military affairs seems less remote.  Yet, the change in the 
currency of power to favor the economic elements of power may also have the unfortunate affect of 
increasing the penalty for unilateral cooperation in economic affairs.  The shifting of interstate 
competition from the military realm to the economic realm, of substituting the shadow of a hot war 
with the shadow of a trade war, may have the effect of transforming the variable-sum game of the 
economic realm into a constant sum game; and of transforming the constant-sum game of the military 
realm into a variable sum game.   
  These changes have three implications.  First, the elaboration of panEuropean institutions 
fostering cooperation in the military realm do not face the insuperable obstacles that existed in the 
postwar period.  Second, the prospect also remains that cooperation and the elaboration of institutions 
fostering cooperation in the economic realm face obstacles that were not faced in the postwar period 
within the respective alliances.  Third, it is likely that cooperation in economic and security affairs will 
be heightened between former adversaries, while cooperation will be burdened among former allies, 
particularly those in NATO. 
  The problem of cooperation in economic and military affairs remains problematic, but not as 
worrisome as in the postwar period.  The military security dilemma has been largely inverted and 
although the potential for economic conflict has been sharpened, it has not yet overwhelmed the 
mutual benefit to be derived by cooperation.  Nonetheless, one difficulty in sustaining cooperation in economic and military affairs has been carried over from the cold war period:  there remains a wide 
variation in the emphasis and definition of security found among the member-states of NATO.  The 
United States, for example, retains a largely military definition of security as well as the conventional 
understanding of economic security, namely, the economy is only important to the extent it affects 
military capability.   France, on the other hand, possesses a broader view of security, but that view 
reflects by and large the concerns of classical realists, of the pursuit of power and plenty as the 
separable but reciprocally dependent elements of national security.   And the Germans, of the major 
European states, have gone farthest in abandoning the military definition of security and embracing a 
definition of security reflecting the preoccupations of a civilian power.   These different conceptions of 
security, which are shared by the other nations of the European security space in differing degrees and 
intensities, present the problem of fashioning a common frame of reference that would enable these 
states to pursue jointly their common and individual security interests.  The desirability of a common 
definition or conception of security would help facilitate cooperation not only on security affairs, but 
more importantly on the elaboration, extension or establishment of security institutions sustaining that 
cooperation.   
  The institutional configuration of the post-cold war security order is emerging.   The architecture 
of the emerging European security order, the interrelationships between institutions of security in the 
military and economic domains, and the coordination between those domains remain more ambiguous 
and plastic.  The most important question facing the future security order revolves around those 
institutional relationships within those two security complexes and, perhaps more importantly, the 
interplay and interdependency between those complexes.  The architectural dimension of the emerging 
European security order revolves around the problem of establishing a coherence within each security 
complex as well as a complementarily between these two security complexes.   
V.  The Requirements of a Comprehensive Security System 
  A comprehensive security system is comprised of two sectors: the military sector and the 
economic sector.  The contemporary problem facing the construction of a stable panEuropean security 
system is the relative weight given to these two components.  The transition to the post-cold war 
international system has had the effect of diminishing the importance of the military element of 
international security and of enhancing the importance of the economic element.  The security 
dilemma has become less intense if not inverted.  The management of economic competition amongst 
the NATO allies and the successful transition to the market economy amongst the former member-
states of the Warsaw Pact are the basic building blocks of the new European security architecture.  The 
passing of the cold war has also had the effect of diminishing the force of anarchy in the shaping of the 
European security environment.  The emergence of a security order without opposed blocs has had the 
effect of altering the interaction capability of the European state system.40   
  The interaction capability of a security system captures not only "the ability and the willingness of 
[states] to interact, but also determine what types and levels of interaction are both possible and 
desired."41  One element of the system's interaction capability is the extent to which states share norms 
and are governed by common institutions.  Institutions, according to Buzan, Jones and Little "greatly 
facilitate, and even promote, interactions that shared norms and values make possible and 
desired...Institutions provide not only more opportunities to communicate, but also more obligations 
and more incentives to do so."42  The states of the European security space increasingly share 
common norms and state interaction is increasingly framed within a common set of institutions.  The 
adoption of common norms and common membership in institutions fostering those norms on a 
panEuropean basis have created a greater interaction capacity within the European security space. 
  This focus on the interaction capability of the system presumes the importance of norms and 
institutions as constraints on state choice in an anarchical system.  The role of institutions in 
international relations is shaped by the conceptual preeminence attained by international regimes, 
defined as "sets of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations and which may help to 
co-ordinate their behaviours."43  The power of regime-based understandings of international politics 
and of the relevance of interaction capacity as a variable explaining the quality of interstate relations is 
found in the neo-institutionalism literature.   
  The new institutionalism "insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions."44  This 
approach permits international institutions to be treated as something other than a clearinghouse for 
information or preferences; rather it suggests that international institutions shape state preferences, how those preferences develop and change, and how states act.  Institutions also serve the important 
function of supplying order in an anarchical world.  Two of the more interesting orders supplied by 
institutions are historical order and normative order.45    Historical order refers to the role played by 
institutions in shaping historical processes.  Although this role played by institutions can only be 
judged ex post, an awareness of the potential historical role an institutional choice may have for a 
given element of a security architecture, for example,  indicates the gravity of the choices made and the 
necessity of carefully selection.  International instability attributable to poor institutional choice to 
guide either military or economic security relations can have a disastrous outcome---the 1930s is a 
good example.46   Normative order directs attention to the consideration of "the relations among 
norms, the significance of ambiguity and inconsistency in norms, and the time path of the 
transformation of normative structures."47  Each of these orders is important in assessing the 
institutional configuration of the emerging European security order:  both suggest a basis for the 
importance of regime congruence and interdependence.  
  The stability of the emerging European system of comprehensive security also remains dependent, 
however, upon the congruence and interdependence of the economic and military security regimes 
governing the European security space.  Regime congruence refers to the requirement that the norms 
governing these separate regimes are mutually reinforcing and that those norms do not conflict in 
purpose.  The interdependence of the military and economic security regimes refers to the requirement 
that the norms of military (economic) regimes generate `positive externalities' that support the norms 
and institutions of the economic (military) regimes.  It also implies that the interdependence of the 
regimes supporting the economic and military components of the overall security architecture are 
mutually dependent:  the instability or incoherence of the one element of the security architecture will 
have the effect of undoing the stability or coherence of the other element.  Institutional design remains 
a critical determinant of the stability and effectiveness of the future European security order.  
  There is clearly a demand for institutions governing the military and economic elements of the 
post-cold war European security space.48  The problem rests in the supply of those institutions and 
their transformation.49  There are three general categories of explanation that have relevance for post-
cold war Europe in understanding the supply and transformation of the regimes encompassing the 
European security space:  hegemony, leadership, and small-n multilateralism.  Hegemonic powers 
provide international regimes---and the elusive collective goods of international cooperation and 
stability---in a broad cluster of economic issue-areas, notably the trade and payments system, out of 
self-interest and the ability to bear the full cost of providing those regimes.   
  A state falling short hegemonic pretensions, but are nonetheless capable of exerting international 
leadership, can also contribute to the provision of international regimes by solving what Peter F. 
Cowhey calls the `top dog' problem of regime provision.50  A state capable of exerting international 
leadership, but falling short of hegemony, may create the favorable conditions necessary to support the 
creation of international regimes, according to William T. Bianco and Robert H. Bates, if the leading 
state has "the means to motivate self-interested individuals to participate in collective action."51  But 
the ability of a state assuming or seeking a position of leadership depends upon its ability to distinguish 
between states that cooperate and defect by providing the former with rewards and by sanctioning the 
latter with punishments.   
  International regimes may be also supplied as the result of small-n multilateralism.  Small-n 
multilateralism, for example the G-7 or G-5, occurs when the significant states in an issue-area agree to 
cooperate in the creation of an international regime.  Cooperation that occurs owing to small-n 
multilateralism provides the opportunity for the creation of an international regime, although it will 
have the effect of limiting the gains from cooperation by restrciting the number of participating states, 
while enhancing the prospects for sustained cooperation.52   
  Leadership and small-n multilateralism are likely to be the important sources of institutional 
supply in the post-cold war European security space.  The majority of the relevant economic and 
security regimes have been carried over from the cold war order; and many are now in the process of 
adaptation to the new international environment.  While many international regimes have their origin 
in the immediate post-war period and owe their existence to American hegemony, it is also the case 
that the adaptation of these regimes to the post-cold war security landscape is the result of small-n 
multilateralism or the leadership of either the United States on issues affecting Atlantic cooperation or 
Germany on issues affecting European cooperation. The absence of a hegemonic power in the post-
cold war European security space suggests that the evolution of existing regimes and the creation of new regimes will require intensive negotiation.  The prospects for an imposed regime in any issue-area 
by a single European or North American power are unlikely.  As a consequence, the task of regime 
construction and adaptation facilitating cooperation in issue-areas ranging from the environment to 
macroeconomic stability to defence will be greatly complicated.  The enhanced prospect of negotiated 
regimes also raises the question of institutional choice in post-cold war Europe. 
  The problem of institutional choice precedes the emergence of the `new' Europe, but has only 
recently emerged as a focal point of either the theoretical or policy-oriented literature.53  The variation 
in international regimes is either attributed to the indeterminacy of a cooperative outcome to a single 
institutional form; i.e., the problem of cooperation could be solved by any number of institutional 
possibilities.  Or it is attributed to the observation that different categories of problem require different 
types of institutional solutions.54  But the end of the cold-war and the institution-building and 
adaptation that characterizes the period after 1989 has given a new prominence and urgency to the 
problem of institutional choice. 
    There are three categories of enquiry that pertain to the issue of institutional choice:  the 
problems associated with the institutional configuration of the security architecture; the problems 
associated with the problem of resolving the dilemmas of cooperation that states (and other actors) face 
within and between issue-areas; and the problem of identifying the content of the emergent security 
architecture.  The resolution of these problems provides a basis for assessing the levels of congruence 
and interdependence between the security regimes of the European security space.   
  The problems associated with the issue of institutional configuration revolve around three issues: 
institutional scope; institutional membership; and the character of the institutional clusters governing 
specific issue-areas.  Institutional scope reflects a concern with the geographic scope of the institution.  
The various institutions of the post-cold war security architecture range from the regional, to the 
Atlantic, to the global.  Membership in these institutions is both selective and universal;  these 
institutions govern both state and nonstate behavior.   This problem area raises a number of questions:  
Is one particular combination of geographic scope and membership optimal in the supply of security to 
the European security area?  Are the problems of institutional redundancy or competition mediated or 
intensified by different or overlapping institutional memberships?  Do nonstate actors play a 
significant role in the provision of security in the new European security architecture?   
  The emergence of institutional clusters within issue-areas raises a set of more compelling 
questions about the congruence and interdependence of the institutions of the European security space.  
Institutional clusters, defined as the set of institutions that govern a specific issue-area within the 
economic or military dimension of security, raise five questions.  First, can the institutional cluster be 
best described as a hierarchy or as a polyarchy.  The answer to this question suggests whether there is 
an overarching institution managing an issue-area with a strategic vision or writ; or whether there is an 
element of conceptual disorder minimizing the effectiveness of these institutions in the governance of 
an element of security.  The second question---Is there a differentiation or conflation of issue-areas?---
directs attention to necessity of compartmentalizing the different elements of the security order without 
precluding cross issue-area linkages or insisting upon them.  A third area of concern revolves around 
the question of whether a single institution has a monopoly of competence within an issue-area or 
shares its competence with another.  The more diluted is the competence for any single issue-area 
within a cluster and the less hierarchically those institutions are ordered, the more likely will be the 
potential level of institutional dissonance.  A fourth problem area arises where institutions share a 
competence for an issue-area:   do they interact according to the principle of subsidiarity or the 
principle of market competition?  In other words, is the institutional cluster structured in such a way 
that conflict resolution and governance within an issue-area are delegated to a multilateral organization 
with a specific competency or are multilateral institutions encouraged to compete in accordance with 
the market metaphor.  The fifth problem area is the determination of whether there is a surfeit or deficit 
of multilateral organizations governing an issue-area, of whether there is an organisational 
disequilibrium.  An institutional disequilibrium can be of two sorts:  there can be a surfeit of 
institutions where too many institutions seek to manage too small a policy space; and there can be a 
deficit of institutions where too few (or unempowered) institutions seek to manage too large a policy 
space.   While this notion of equilibrium and disequilibrium is difficult to define with any precision, it 
remains problematic nonetheless.   
  Closely related to the complex of issues surrounding the configuration of institutional clusters are 
those pertaining to the problem of interstate cooperation.  The different components of economic and military security present states with distinctly different inhibitions to and incentives for cooperation 
and conflict.  The problem of cooperation and conflict has become the focal point of international 
relations theory, particularly the problem of fostering economic cooperation.  Both cooperation and 
conflict may be on occasion inevitable and unremediable---in game theoretic jargon, two states may 
find themselves confronting a structure of payoffs providing neither an incentive to defect (Harmony) 
or inducing either to cooperate (Deadlock).  The need for institutions and the potential role institutions 
can play in facilitating cooperation requires that the payoff structures that states face provide both an 
inducement to cooperate, but also the temptation to defect.55   
  In the analysis of the institutional clusters managing the core areas of the emerging European 
security architecture, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the existing and proposed 
institutional frameworks facilitate cooperation or coordination of state action.  This question is 
particularly pressing for the analysis of the economic components of European security.  It is essential 
to assure the operation of mechanisms facilitating the coordination of common problems within an 
issue-area (e.g., the need to coordinate debt negotiations between commercial and official creditors).  
There is a similar need for policy coordination between issue areas (e.g., the need for the `greening' of 
European Investment Bank finance for eastern and central European in accordance with the Fifth 
Environmental Action Plan of the European Union).  And there is a need to coordinate the economic 
and military dimensions of security where they intersect (e.g., coordinating the reduction of forces in 
Europe with the macroeconomic policies aiding defence conversion).   
  The problem of coordination within and between issue-areas and the opening up of the political 
space in Europe suggests an increase in the `dynamic density' or `interaction capability' of the post-
cold war European security space.56  There has been an increase in the number and types of 
transactions that now take place in the European security space.  This change raises the question of the 
content or substance of the future European security architecture.  The most important issue of content 
is the selection of the relevant dimensions of the economy that can be properly treated as distinct 
security areas.   The close connection between the future stability of the European security space and 
the successful political and economic transformation of central and eastern Europe leads suggests two 
clusters of economic security institutions:   a cluster encompassing exchange rate stability, the freeing 
of trade, and macroeconomic policy coordination; and a cluster encompassing the interconnected 
problems of debt overhang, financing the recasting of central and eastern Europe, and the resolution of 
common environmental problems.  These security clusters and their institutional manifestations raise 
three interconnected questions: Do these regimes share a common set of overriding principles?  What 
balance should be struck between regime autonomy and regime interdependence?  What level of 
legitimacy is now accorded the parts of the European security architecture?   
  The economic components of the security architecture are ordered in compliance with the 
principles of the market economy.  It is largely assumed that the market place, subject to the demands 
of domestic governance, should allocate resources within and between states.  The market principle 
and its domestic political adjunct, a competitive multiparty system, have been adopted as the 
constitutional principles of the nations of central and eastern Europe.  These two principles form the 
basis of the normative orders governing the post-cold war European security system.  These principles 
also raise two additional questions about the norms governing the security institutions of the new 
Europe:  Which norms govern domestic behaviour?  Which norms govern the international behaviour 
of states?57   
  A comprehensive treatment of the emerging European security architecture requires the 
decomposition of that architecture into its component parts, into sets of interlocking institutional 
clusters.  There are three institutional clusters defining the post-cold war security architecture:  the 
political-military cluster, the exchange rate-trade-macroeconomic policy cluster, and the finance-debt-
environment cluster.  The stability of the emerging architecture depends upon the normative 
congruence within and interdependence between those clusters.  The argument presented above 
suggests that careful attention must be paid to institutional choice and identified some criteria for that 
choice.  A final set of arguments surrounded the problem of institutional supply.  In post-cold war 
Europe, these institutional elements of the security order will not be supplied by a single hegemonic 
state.  The more likely dynamic driving institutional choice and design is that of persuasive leadership 
or small-n multilateralism.  The treatment of these different elements of the security architecture raise 
other important questions about the substance and theory of institutional choice and consequence in 
post-cold war Europe. VI.  The Future Paths of the European Security System 
  The future of the European security system remains uncertain.  No path of evolution is yet 
foreclosed.   There are three general directions that the European security system may follow:  greater 
integration, greater differentiation, and disintegration.  These three directions no doubt relfect a a 
psychological predisposition towards optimism, scepticism, and pessimism, respectively.  Continued 
and deepened integration, the path expected by optimists, would continue along two paths:  the 
economic and the military.  Greater economic integration would yield increased economic openness, 
particularly more intense trade ties and greater financial market integration, and greater cooperation on 
issues ranging from exchange rate management and macroeconomic policy coordination to common 
environmental policies.  This economic integration would occur simultaneously between the nations of 
the European Union, between the European Union and the nations of eastern and north central Europe, 
and between Europe and North America.  Likewise, military cooperation would include the continued 
viability of NATO and its extension eastwards to include the nations of north central Europe and 
perhaps the Baltic states, the strengthening of the military component of the European Union, and the 
elaboration of a pan-European security institution, be it within the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or within the context of the NATO `partnership for peace' programme.  
Continued and deepened economic and military integration should have the effect of encouraging 
cooperation in the European security area and ensuring a `doubly safe' security environment.  
  Another potential path, envisioned perhaps by sceptics, would be that of greater regional 
differentiation between the nations of the European security space.  Greater differentiation could 
reflect the strengthening of regional economic and military identities that coexists and encourages 
greater pan-regional integration, a development anticipated, for example, with the `dumbbell' concept 
of the Atlantic economy in the 1960s.  Whilst such an option is not precluded, it has become 
complicated by the prospect of a `dumbbell' Europe.  The aspiration of the nations of north central 
Europe---the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary---to become integral members of 
the European Union and the Western European Union, combined with the inevitable deepening of 
trade ties with the successor states of the former Soviet Union, promise an eastwards reorientation of 
the European Union.  That reorientation, driven by calculations of commercial complementarily and 
strategic interest, could result in the loosening of the bonds between North America and western 
Europe.   
  The political and strategic fall-out from such a development could range from a benevolent 
mercantilism, what has been referred to as an `open regionalism,' to a benign mercantilism, or 
`defensive protectionism.'58  `Open regionalism' anticipates the creation of a regional political-
strategic identity, of a preferential economic zone buttressed by not-too-discriminatory barriers to trade, 
the encouragement of cross-regional industrial alliances, and the harmonisation of industrial standards.  
Yet open regionalism, as the name implies, would not actively foster the division of the world into 
regional economies by vitiating the market mechanism; trade between the regions would be neither 
encouraged nor discouraged, or would an effort be made to reduce the existing levels of economic 
interdependence.  `Defensive protectionism,' on the other hand, would employ many of the same 
instruments as open regionalism, but the objective would be the division of the global economy into a 
series of regional and self-contained economies.  In this case, there would be a vitiation of the market 
mechanism---trade would be managed according to political diktat rather than responding to market-
dictated opportunities and constraints---and the existing levels of global financial, commercial, and 
monetary interdependencies would be replaced with a set of regional interdependencies.  The 
seamlessness of the global economy would be replaced by a series of loosely confederated regional 
economies.  Either of these mercantilisms may be considered as a `welfare mercantilism' driven by the 
concern with the restoring the governability of national economies and the protection of the welfare 
gains already gleaned from freer trade in the postwar period.  Moreover, this form of mercantilism 
would not necessarily unleash the destructively competitive forces associated with the mercantilism of 
the 1930s;59 it need not rekindle or deepen the security dilemma---it leaves open the possibility that 
the gentle regionalization of economic relations could be complemented by panregional security 
institutions. 
  The final path, anticipated by pessimists, would be the disintegration of the global economic 
system.  Disintegration would imply the conscious reversal of the level of economic openness between 
the North American and European pillars of the Atlantic economy.  In the more mild form, a 
`malevolent mercantilism' would simply result in intense regional economic competition characterized by trade barriers severely limiting the possibility for trade, by the reintroduction of protected capital 
markets, and perhaps even by the introduction of multiple exchange rates.  The process of economic 
closure would be sharpened by a regional preoccupation with the hierarchy of prestige in the 
international system, by the pursuit of technological dominance, and by the creation and support of 
regional champions in those industries competing for dominance on the technological frontier.  
Economic capacity and technological advantage would be assessed and prized not from a the 
perspective of maximizing welfare, but from the perspective of maximizing (relative) power.    
  The `strong' version of disintegration simply reduces the size of the economic unit from a regional 
constellation to the national economy.  Disintegration of the global economy into robust and highly 
competitive, if not antagonistic, blocs or national economies would reintroduce the security dilemma 
into the European security space.  Moreover, it would upend the existing institutional solutions to the 
security dilemma states face today:  disintegration, in either its national or regional manifestation, runs 
against the logic of collective defense or a permanent alliance system and favours what has been the 
historically disastrous dependence upon self-help and shifting alliances. 
IV. Conclusion 
  Institutional choice in shaping the future European security order has become a central element of 
American and European foreign policy strategies.  The preferred institutions of security in both the 
military and economic dimensions differ across national boundaries; the competition for delivering the 
blue-print for that architecture is particularly marked between the United States, the major western 
European states (Britain, France, and Germany), and Russia.  The broad definition of security and the 
competition to supply the outlines of the security architecture poses a barrier to great power 
cooperation in constructing a coherant European security system.  Moreover, it remains likely that the 
intended roles to be played by institutions in the new security environment will remain unfulfilled.60   
The proliferation of institutions and new forms of cooperation that are spanning Europe across the 
economic and military dimensions of security will undoubtedly generate both intended and unintended 
consequences.  The process of small-n multilateralism may put into place a set of security institutions 
built upon an incompatible jumble of great power preferences that please no one and erode the quality 
of European security. 
  An assessment of the emerging security architecture requires an assessment of its parts, of the 
critical institutional clusters.  A successful security architecture requires that these institutional clusters 
generate positive external economies that contribute to the interdependence of those clusters and the 
integration of the military and economic dimensions of security.  The congruence within institutional 
clusters matched by the interdependence of those clusters implies parallel progress in the development 
and elaboration of the constituent elements of the security architecture.  But the parallel progress of 
those clusters cannot be taken for granted; it is probably more reasonable to assume that progress will 
be dysnchronous rather than synchronous.  What are the causes and consequence of uneven progress?   
A potential barrier to even progress and source of potential regress is the inability of the states of the 
former Warsaw Pact to successfully conclude the economic and political recasting of those societies.  
The successful fashioning of institutions fostering economic and military cooperation depends in large 
part upon the increasing homogeneity of the European nation-states; of the creation of a common 
political and economic frame of reference generating a common and legitimate normative order 
governing Europe.  A failure at this level, which suggests the failure of the institutions of economic 
security, implies the inevitable collapse of a cooperative pan-European security order.   
  The recasting of these societies has been made possible and supported at the international level.  
The context of state choice has changed dramatically.  The security dilemma has been mitigated if not 
inverted.  Yet it is more than likely that progress in the construction of the economic dimension of the 
security architecture will outstrip the construction of the military dimension.  As compared with the 
military sector, the payoffs and costs of cooperation in the economic sector are relatively certain, the 
costs of compliance and noncompliance are relatively well-established, the constraints on adverse state 
conduct are relatively well-established, and the institutional mechanisms facilitating cooperation are 
long-standing and highly developed.  The same cannot be said for the military element of security.  
Here we find that the payoffs and costs of cooperation, particularly between former adversaries, are 
uncertain, the costs of compliance and non-compliance are high-risk and difficult to reverse, and the 
institutional mechanisms facilitating cooperation are relatively underdeveloped and the experience 
with them chequered.  The process of uneven progress is affected by yet another consideration:   the 
incongruity between the economic and military payoffs derived from cooperation combined with the domestic political costs of cooperating in either dimension.  It may be that the high symbolic cost of 
cooperation in the military dimension of security, calculated in terms of lost national prestige and 
autonomy, may present too high a political barrier to military cooperation on a panEuropean basis.  
And it may be that the measurable payoffs flowing from cooperation in the economic dimension of 
security may be likewise stymied by domestic political resistance.  These considerations establish the 
linkage between domestic politics and interstate cooperation.  There may be some unique level of 
interstate cooperation on the military and economic dimensions of security that are domestically 
sustainable.  The tolerance for external cooperation to sustain domestic welfare and security objectives 
will vary between states and will place a limit on the overall level of cooperation within post-cold war 
Europe.  Although cooperation in both issue-areas may be derailed by domestic political resistance, it 
is unlikely that the economic and military trains would fall off the tracks at the same point of 
institutional development.  The possibility of dysynchronous development of the two elements of the 
post-cold war security architecture raises the important question of whether autonomous or 
differentiated progress in the economic and military elements of the security order can be safely 
tolerated if the overall stability of the system is to be assured. 
   The consequences of uneven development in the institutional elaboration of the two elements of 
security or uneven progress in the supply of military and economic security could have disastrous 
results for Europe.  Although there has been a real decrease in the likelihood of major war, it remains 
the case that there is no comprehensive set of institutions that effectively monitor and manage the 
military dimension of European security.  There are no countervailing sets of institutions in operation 
that could foster greater economic or military security in eastern and central Europe, not to mention the 
former Soviet Union.  The exclusion of the eastern and central European states, as well as the now 
independent states of the former Soviet Union, from full participation in the existing military 
institutions of security (e.g., NATO or the WEU), combined with the inclusion of those same nations 
in the institutions of economic security suggests a fundamental disequilibrium in the European security 
system today.  
  This imbalance suggests a reconsideration of the future course of Europe.  If the minimum level of 
interdependence between the economic and military elements of security can not be realised with the 
existing institutions of security, it may counsel the creation of a security architecture that tolerates if 
not encourages the development of economic and military differentiation of the European area.  It may 
counsel a return to a set of security institutions mimicking those established in the aftermath of the 
second world war, but not marred by the ideological enmity or competition between Russia and the 
United States.  If the minimum level of interdependence is sufficiently low and is met by the existing 
institutions of security,  it may counsel a less drastic course:  economic differentiation or integration 
complemented by cooperation in a less formalized or inclusive set of security institutions.   
  The resolution of this dilemma may be found in the distribution of capabilities in post-cold war 
Europe.  The distribution of capabilities raises the issue of polarity and reemerges as a critical variable 
in the determination of the broad contours of the European security system.  If military power recedes 
into the deep background of diplomacy, if military power becomes merely the foundation of interstate 
relations in Europe but no longer functions as an instrument of state-craft, the states occupying the 
European security space will be driven by one of the many logics ascribed to economic multipolarity:  
at one extreme, it will either provide a more fertile basis for cooperation and stability; and at the other, 
it promises a return to the competitive and noncooperative world of neo-mercantilism.  The choice of 
institutions in both the economic and military dimensions of security will largely define the pathway 
that is eventually chosen for Europe.  
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